











This	 article	 explores	 competing	 interpretive	 frames	 regarding	 shale	 gas	 in	 Bulgaria,	 Poland,	 and	
Romania.	 These	 countries	 face	 the	 choice	 of	 embracing	 shale	 gas	 as	 a	 potential	 revolutionizing	
domestic	source	of	energy,	against	the	backdrop	of	Russia	serving	as	the	dominant	gas	supplier.	This	
makes	them	interesting	cases	for	studying	how	policy	narratives	and	discourses	coalesce	around	a	
novel	 technology.	 The	 findings,	which	 are	based	on	 sixty‐six	 semistructured	 research	 interviews,	
point	 to	 differing	 and	 indeed	 competing	 frames,	 ranging	 from	 national	 security,	 environmental	
boons,	 to	 economic	 sellout	 and	 authoritarianism,	with	different	 sets	 of	 institutions	 sharing	 those	
frames.	This	suggests	that	enhancing	energy	security	by	way	of	deploying	novel	energy	technologies	







Shale	 gas	 has	 changed	 the	 energy	 industry.	 The	 primary	 technical	 driver	 behind	 the	 “shale	 gas	
revolution”	is	a	leap	in	technical	innovation:	hydraulic	fracturing,	or	“fracking”	for	short,	coupled	with	
horizontal	drilling	(Sovacool	2014a).	These	advances	in	technology	allow	exploiting	reserves	trapped	
in	 deep‐rock	 formations.	 Today,	 shale	 gas—both	 the	 largest	 source	 of	 and	 a	 popular	 term	 for	
unconventional	hydrocarbons—represents	some	45	percent	of	total	US	gas	output	(EIA	2014).			
	
Clearly,	 fracking	 technology	 is	 contested.	 It	 offers	 material	 benefits	 to	 the	 countries	 using	 the	
technology,	in	the	shape	of	economic	welfare,	tax	dollar	income,	or	security	gains	in	an	energy	world	







between	 societal	 groups,	 the	 characteristics	 of	 incumbent	 socio‐technical	 systems,	 and	 the	












Fracking	has	become	subject	 to	scholarly	 investigation	 from	a	range	of	disciplines.	Most	research	
from	the	energy	studies	field	has	continued	to	emphasize	technical	and	economic	concerns,	ignoring	
more	 surreptitious	 yet	 salient	 social,	 political,	 and	 cultural	 elements	 (Sovacool	 2014b;	 Sovacool	
2014c).	A	rapidly	growing	literature	beyond	the	energy	studies	community	is	particularly	looking	at	
the	public	 attitudes,	 social	 contestation,	 and	public	discourse	 surrounding	 fracking	 (Boudet	 et	 al.	
2014;	Brasier	et	al.	2011;	Brown	et	al.	2013;	Cotton	et	al.	2014;	Evensen	et	al.	2014;	Hudgins	and	







studying	 how	 policy	 narratives	 and	 discourses	 coalesce	 around	 a	 novel	 technology,	 and	 the	
interpretative	frames	assigned	to	that	technology	in	these	countries.	
	





discourse	 and	 in	 policy‐making	 (Bomberg	 2015;	 Feindt	 and	 Oels	 2005;	 Lachapelle	 et	al.	 2014;	











its	 consumed	 gas,	 and	 Bulgaria	 96	 percent.	 Romania	 constitutes	 an	 outlier,	 with	 a	 15	 percent	
dependence	 rate	 (Eurogas	 2014).	 However,	 Romania’s	 conventional	 production	 is	 set	 to	 decline	
significantly	by	2020	(KPMG	2012),	which	will	 likely	 increase	 the	country’s	currently	 low	 import	




Importantly,	 all	 of	 these	 countries	 share	a	 common	history	as	planned	economies,	which	 implies	
similar	 regulatory	 legacies	 and	 a	 strong	 state	 bias.	 In	 addition,	 they	 are	 subject	 to	 identical	 EU	
environmental	regulations.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	left	to	nation	states	to	choose	the	energy	mix	and	











of	 cumulative	 consumption	 (EIA/ARI	2013).	The	 exploitation	of	 fracking	would	 therefore	benefit	
countries	 that	 all	 come	 with	 similar	 high	 import	 dependences	 on	 Russia	 and	 that	 face	
decarbonization	imperatives	stemming	from	EU	climate	policies.	In	fact,	the	governments	of	all	three	
countries	have	publicly	supported	shale	gas	exploration,	regardless	of	their	party	orientation.	This	














is	 usually	 described	 as	 a	 technical	 “artifact,”	 and	 society	 (Bijker	 1993;	 Misa	 1988).	 Within	 this	
framework,	 four	 important	elements	have	been	developed:	the	relevant	social	group,	 interpretive	
flexibility,	closure	and	stabilization,	and	the	technological	frame.	
	
The	 relevant	 social	 group	 denotes	 the	 institutions	 and	 organizations	 that	 share	 the	 same	 set	 of	
meanings	 attached	 to	 a	 particular	 technology	 (Bijker	 1992;	 Bijker	 1995;	 Bijker	 1997;	 Pinch	 and	
Bijker	 1984).	 The	 social	 groups	 that	 constitute	 parts	 of	 the	 “environment”	 for	 technology	 play	 a	
critical	role	in	shaping	and	defining	the	problems	that	arise	during	the	development	of	an	artifact;	




















relevant	 social	 groups	and	 lead	 to	 the	attribution	of	meanings	 to	 technical	artifacts—and	 thus	 to	














between	2012	and	2014.	Most	of	 these	 interviews	were	conducted	 in	Poland	(twenty‐seven)	and	
Bulgaria	(thirty),	and	the	remaining	nine	occurred	in	Romania	(see	Table	A2	in	the	Appendix).	The	
cases	 of	 Poland	 and	 Bulgaria—countries	 representing	 opposite	 ends	 of	 the	 shale	 gas	 policy	
spectrum—serve	to	identify	diverging	national‐level	frames	for	shale	gas.	The	case	of	Romania,	by	



















This	 caveat	 pertains	 primarily	 to	 civil	 society,	 which	 remains	 slightly	 underrepresented.	 To	 the	
extent	possible,	this	problem	was	addressed	through	triangulation	with	other	data	sources.	Third,	






by	 coding	 and	 then	 grouping	 key	 terms	 used	 by	 the	 interviewees	 to	 describe	 their	 attitudes	 or	
expectations	 toward	 framing.	Then	we	compare	variations	 in	 frames	across	countries,	and	assess	
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state	 revenues	on	national	 and	 subnational	 levels,	 and	 the	 competitiveness	of	 the	manufacturing	
industry	 constitute	 the	 core	of	 this	 frame.	This	narrative	 essentially	mirrors	 statements	made	by	
Radoslav	 Sikorski,	 Poland’s	 former	 foreign	minister,	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 shale	 gas	 could	make	 the	
country	“a	second	Norway.”3	The	frame	was	found	to	be	most	dominant	among	business,	the	oil‐and‐
gas	 sector,	 and	 the	 state	 administration,	 but	 it	was	 also	 supported	by	 a	 broader	 cross‐section	 of	
societal	actors.	
	
In	 the	words	 of	 a	 director‐level	 representative	 of	 the	 Polish	 Confederation	 of	 Private	 Employers	






interviewee	 representing	 the	 Office	 of	 the	Minister	 of	 the	 Treasury—the	 body	 overseeing	 state‐
owned	companies—stressed	that	“[w]e	will	do	our	best	to	help	investors,	because	our	companies	




For	 representatives	 of	 the	 extractive	 industry,	 “[s]hale	 gas	 can	 be	 an	 impulse	 and	 driver	 for	 the	
economy,”	 according	 to	 a	 manager	 at	 United	 Oilfield	 Services,	 a	 private	 Polish	 energy	 service	
company,	particularly	against	the	backdrop	of	Polish	gas	prices,	generally	perceived	as	being	among	
the	highest	in	Europe.	Because	of	the	potential	of	the	Polish	shale	reserves,	a	former	advisor	to	the	
Polish	 foreign	 minister	 alleged,	 “[s]ome	 of	 the	 [major	 international	 oil	 and	 gas	 companies]	 are	
viewing	Poland	as	a	base	for	their	European	oil	and	gas	business.”	Representatives	of	state‐owned	
companies	also	point	to	the	opportunities	coming	with	shale	gas—possibly	a	function	of	the	Polish	
government	 insisting	 on	 making	 them	 part	 of	 private‐industry‐led	 gas	 exploration.	 As	 the	 chief	












frame	 connects	 to	 Poland’s	 historical	 trauma	 of	 being	 geographically	 located	 between	 major	
European	powers.	As	coined	by	the	manager	at	United	Oilfield	Services,	“energy	is	a	foreign	policy	
tool	 for	 Russia	 [and]	 shale	 gas	 opens	 up	 the	 possibility	 of	 being	 more	 secure	 from	 Russia’s	
monopolistic	 position.”	 Other	 representatives	 of	 the	 Polish	 business	 community	 seconded	 this	
statement.	 Public	 officials	 remarked	 that	 “shale	 gas	 [is]	 part	 of	 [Poland’s]	 diversification	 policy”	
(representative	 of	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Minister	 of	 the	 Treasury).	 Interviews	 with	 members	 of	 the	





.	.	.	 from	Russia.”	Even	 for	Polish	environmental	NGOs,	 “sovereignty	 is	 important,”	as	alleged	by	a	
representative	of	Cleantech	Poland,	 a	 consultancy	 firm.	That	 said,	 environmental	NGOs	 remained	
among	 the	 more	 cautious	 observers,	 hinting	 that	 the	 business	 community	 may	 only	 utilize	 the	






more	 contested.	To	 some,	 fracking	 technology	 represents	 an	environmental	bane	 in	Poland,	 as	 in	
other	 European	 countries.	 The	 prospects	 of	 drillings	 using	 horizontal	 hydraulic	 fracturing	 have	
indeed	 raised	 protests	 among	 the	 local	 population.	 A	 prominent	 case	 in	 point	 is	 the	 village	 of	
Zurawlow,	 whose	 inhabitants	 have	 successfully	 mobilized	 against	 drilling	 activities	 planned	 by	
Chevron.4	Skepticism	has	grown	mainly	regarding	groundwater	safety	issues	and	the	risks	posed	to	





boon.	 This	 frame	 is	 supported	 by	 members	 of	 the	 business	 community,	 parts	 of	 the	 state	
administration,	 and,	 surprisingly,	 even	 the	 environmental	 community.	 As	 representatives	 of	 the	
employers’	 association,	 oil	 and	 gas	 companies	 and	 the	 business	 community	 stressed	 during	 the	
interviews	that	Poland	may	face	economic	pressure	related	to	the	European	carbon‐trading	scheme	
and	rising	carbon	prices—a	function	of	the	country’s	power	supply	relying	primarily	on	coal.	Shale	



























the	 EU’s	 poorest	 country,	 and	 even	 forced	 governments	 to	 leave	 office.6	 It	 has	 been	 alleged	 by	
Bulgarian	 authorities	 that	 domestic	 sources	 of	 gas	 would	 ameliorate	 the	 situation	 and	 reduce	
exposure	to	price	hikes	induced	by	the	prevalent	oil	indexation.7	Furthermore,	as	the	former	deputy	




This	 national	 security	 and	 economic	 opportunity	 narrative	 resonated	 among	 some	 of	 the	
interviewees.	However,	it	did	not	prove	strong	enough	to	be	supported	by	key	actors:	Bulgaria,	in	



















the	 widespread	 perception	 that	 “when	 things	 start	 to	 collapse,	 companies	 just	 give	 up,	 but	
environmental	 problems	 remain”	 (Member	of	 За	 Земята—Friends	of	 the	Earth	Bulgaria).	As	 the	









lifetime	 of	 the	 lease],	 only	 a	 symbolic	 rent	 for	 the	municipal	 lands.”	 Concession	 fees	 for	 natural	
resources	are	considered	low	by	international	standards,	which	has	caused	particular	controversy	in	
the	case	of	the	Bulgarian	gold	mining	sector.8	While	observers,	notably	from	academia,	stressed	the	
opportunities	 that	 would	 be	 missed,	 the	 general	 perception,	 which	 also	 resonated	 among	 the	












“it	 looked	 like	the	government	had	an	agreement	with	Chevron	without	 [a	proper]	assessment	of	
















activities	 related	 to	planned	drilling	 activities.	 Information	 campaigns	were	pursued	 “in	 a	purely	
lobbyist	fashion”	(ibid.),	and	“[t]hings	were	presented	as	if	everything	is	going	to	be	alright”	(member	
of	За	Земята—Friends	of	the	Earth	Bulgaria).	As	a	result,	people	started	to	source	information	from	
the	 Internet,	with	Gasland,	 the	American	documentary	 on	 shale	 gas,	 being	 cited	 as	 a	 key	 source.	




















noted	 by	 two	 senior	 scientists	 of	 the	 Bulgarian	 Academy	 of	 Sciences’	 Geological	 Institute,	 “the	
population	was	 frightened	 and	waited	 for	 some	 kind	 of	 apocalypses	 provoked	 by	 shale	 gas	 and	





with	 some	researchers	 siding	with	environmentalists	and	some	not.	 Scientists	 critical	of	 fracking	
were	 even	 alleged	 to	 form	 part	 of	 “epistemic	 communities	 .	.	.	 naturally	 leaning	 in	 favor	 of	
























































national	 economy	 and	 energy	 security”	 (Romanian	 ambassador‐at‐large	 for	 energy	 security	 and	














Industry	 and	 Services	 Commission).	 Shale	 gas	 “would	 be	 a	 contribution	 to	 our	 energy	 balance”	
(director	 of	 ANPM)	 and	 may	 “strengthen	 Romania’s	 energy	 security	 .	.	.	,	 which	 is	 particularly	
important	in	the	current	regional	geopolitical	context”	(ambassador‐at‐large	for	energy	security).	In	














permanent	 positions	 in	 this	 industry.”	 Seconding	 this,	 and	 echoing	 arguments	 also	 made	 in	 the	



































the	 shale	 gas	 critics,	 on	 the	 other.	 As	 the	 president	 of	 Terra	Mileniul	 III	 alleged,	 “scientists	 and	
academics	that	often	promote	shale	gas	.	.	.	are	happy	to	get	a	small	research	contract	financed	by	the	













Analysts	 at	 Expert	 Forum	pointed	 to	 the	heavy	 security	 apparatus	deployed	 to	protect	 shale	 gas	













gas	 as	 an	 environmental	 bane	 due	 to	 its	 impacts	 on	 water	 and	 ecosystems,	 as	 a	 mechanism	 of	





groups	 across	 two	 or	 more	 countries	 implies	 a	 commonality	 of	 interpretation.	 That	 is,	 despite	






Third,	 cross‐country	 exchange	 clearly	 exists	 among	 the	 groups	 subscribing	 to	 a	 given	 frame.	
Moreover,	media	or	films	such	as	Gasland	foster	the	transnational	dissemination	or	solidification	of	
certain	frames.	At	the	same	time,	different	sets	of	institutions	tend	to	gather	behind	or	share	frames.	











will	provoke	a	heterogeneous	mix	of	 varying	 reactions,	based	on	both	 the	 type	of	 relevant	 social	
group	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 particular	 frame.	 The	 interpretive	 flexibility	 of	 shale	 gas	 therefore	
reminds	 us	 that	 energy	 projects	 not	 only	 mark	 the	 physical	 landscape	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	
production	and	distribution	of	natural	gas	or	other	energy	sources.	They	can	also	transfer	what	were	






These	 findings	 bear	 important	 implications	 for	 other	 fields	 of	 social	 inquiry,	 including	 security	
studies—a	 field	 mostly	 concerned	 with	 the	 geopolitical	 implications	 of	 shale	 gas.	 As	 this	 study	
reveals,	new	energy	technologies	such	as	shale	gas	interact	in	mutually	reinforcing	ways	with	social,	









hidden)	 social	 dimensions	 threaten	 to	 naturalize	 them	 as	 part	 of	 the	 normal	 environment	 and	
depoliticize	them	as	acceptable	risks.	
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Appendix	
	
Table	A1	
Summary	of	Shale	Gas	Interpretive	Frames,	Locations,	and	Relevant	Social	Groups	in	Eastern	
Europe 
	 Interpretive	
Frame	
Present	in Relevant	Social	
Group(s)	
Description	
Positive		 Economic	
opportunity	
Poland,	Bulgaria Government	
ministries,	private	
energy	companies	
Shale	gas	will	
endow	countries	
and	communities	
with	jobs,	economic	
development,	tax	
revenue	and	in	
some	situations	a	
reindustrialization	
of	the	economy	
	
	 National	
security	
Poland,	Bulgaria Energy	consumers,	
some	government	
ministries,	private	
energy	companies,	
members	of	civil	
society		
Shale	gas	will	
enable	countries	to	
liberate	themselves	
from	dependence	
on	energy	imports	
(particularly	from	
Russia)	and	
enhance	regional	
stability	
	 Environmental	
boon	
Poland	 Trade	groups,	
unions,	private	
companies,	some	
environmentalists,	
some	politicians		
	
Shale	gas	will	assist	
Poland	in	its	
process	of	national	
decarbonization		
Negative		 Environmental	
bane	
Poland,	Bulgaria Local	communities,	
environmental	
nongovernmental	
organizations	
Shale	gas	threats	
water	quality	and	
availability,	risks	
chemical	pollution,	
and	can	accelerate	
species	loss	and	the	
destruction	of	
habitats	
	 Economic	
sellout	
Bulgaria Political	parties,	
some	civil	society	
groups,	some	trade	
Shale	gas	
production	merely	
transfers	wealth	
17 
 
unions	and	business	
associations,	local	
public	
administrators,	
some	academics	
and	revenue	out	of	
domestic	economies	
to	foreign	actors	
	 Energy	
authoritarianism	
Bulgaria Trade	and	business	
associations,	local	
public	
administrators,	
some	civil	society	
groups	
Shale	gas	decision‐
making	is	opaque,	
can	concentrate	
political	power,	and	
marginalize	local	
communities		
	
	
Table	A2	
Summary	of	Interviewees	
Position	 Organization
Poland	 	
President	 Polish	Ecological	Club	(Central‐Eastern	Region)	
Economist,	strategy	and	PPM	
department	
PKN	Orlen
Expert,	Department	of	Energy	
and	Climate	Change	
Polish	Confederation	of	Private	Employers	Lewiatan	(PKPP	
Lewiatan)		
President	of	the	board Environmental	Protection	League,	Lublin		
Advisor	to	minister	and	to	chief	
national	geologist	
Ministry	of	the	Environment
Country	manager,	business	
development	
United	Oilfield	Services
Director‐level	expert,	
Department	of	Energy	and	
Climate	Change	
Polish	Confederation	of	Private	Employers	Lewiatan	(PKPP	
Lewiatan)		
Chairman	 Poland’s	Green 2004	Party
Chief	expert,	Department	of	
Economic	Policy	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
Deputy	director	 Regional	Directorate	for	Environmental	Protection	(RDOS)
Former	advisor	to	foreign	
minister	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
Executive	director	 Cleantech	Poland	
Advisor	&	geologist	 Instytut	Studiow	Energetycznych	/	Institute	of	Energy	
Studies	
Professor	 Polish	Institute	of	Soil	Science
Professor	 Polish	Institute	of	Soil	Science
Professor	 John	Paul	II	Catholic	University	of Lublin	(KUL)	
Expert,	economic	policy	
department	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
Energy	and	natural	resources	
lawyer	
White & Case	Warsaw
Corporate	affairs	manager	 Talisman	Energy
18 
 
General	manager	 Talisman	Energy	Polska	Sp.
Researcher,	economics	
department	
Warsaw	University	
Project	coordinator	 Climate	Coalition
Researcher	and	policy	analyst	 Instytut	na	rzecz	Ekorozwoju	/	Polish	Institute	for	
Sustainable	Development,	Projekt	LIFE+	„Dobry	Klimat	dla	
Powiatów”	
Expert,	Department	of	Strategic	
Projects,	Office	of	the	Minister		
Ministry	of	the	Treasury
Poland	representative	 NaftaGaz	Poland
Professor	in	power	engineering	 Technical	University	of	Lodz,	Poland
Institute	of	Electric	Power	Engineering	
Professor	 John	Paul	II	Catholic	University	of	Lublin	(KUL)	
Bulgaria	 	
Regional	leader	in	antifracking	
organization	
Dobrich—anti‐shale	movement
Antifracking	leader	/	co‐chair	 Anti‐shale‐gas	coalition	/	Green party
Professor	 Sofia	University,	Faculty	of	Economics	and	Business	
Administration	
Member	of	parliament Bulgarian	Parliament;	chairman	of	the	parliamentary	
Committee	on	Economic	Policy,	Energy	and	Tourism,	
member	of	Union	of	Democratic	Forces	party	
Member	of	parliament	/	former	
deputy	minister	
National	assembly	/	former	minister	of	economy,	energy	and	
tourism,	Citizens	for	European	Development	of	Bulgaria	
(GERB)	party	
Mayor	 General	Toshevo municipality,	member	of	Bulgarian	Socialist	
Party	(BSP)	
Mayor	 Dobrich	urban	municipality,	GERB
Former	member	of	parliament,	
Leader	
Energy	Independence	Movement
Director‐level	expert	 Regional	Inspectorate	for	Environment	and	Water	Varna
Director‐level	expert,	
Department	of	Energy	
Resources	and	Concessions	
Ministry	of	Economy	and	Energy	/	Bulgarian	Energy	and	
Mining	Forum	
Managing	partner	at	private	
energy	consultancy	/	former	
ambassador	of	Bulgaria	in	
Russia	
Innovative	Energy	Solutions	/	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
Campaigner	 Fracking	Free	Bulgaria	Initiative
Analysts,	Economic	Program	 Center	for	the	Study	of	Democracy
Analysts,	Economic	Program	 Center	for	the	Study	of	Democracy
Municipal	deputy	mayor	 Dobrich	rural	municipality
Chief	environmental	expert	 Dobrich	rural	municipality
Head	of	environmental	unit	 Dobrich	urban	municipality
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Member	of	the	board	of	
directors	and	head	of	the	
exploration	unit	
Oil	and	Exploration	and	Production	Plc.	
Former	advisor	to	minister	of	
economy	and	energy	&	former	
ambassador‐at‐large	for	energy	
and	climate	change	
Ministry	of	Economy	and	Energy
Deputy	director	 Geological	Institute,	Bulgarian	Academy	of	Sciences	
Professor	 Sofia	University,	Department	of	Geology	and	Geography
Professor	(retired),	hydrologist,	
anti‐shale‐gas	activist	
Bulgarian	Academy	of	Sciences
Professor	 Institute	of	Geology,	Bulgarian	Academy	of	Sciences	
Drilling	supervisor	 Genting	Oil	&	Gas
Director	of	strategic	planning	
and	investments	
Bulgarian	Federation	of	the	Industrial	Energy	Consumers	
(BFIEC)/	Stomana	Industry	
Head	of	unit	in	the	Water	
Management	Directorate	
State	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Water
Member	 За	Земята—Friends	of	the	Earth	Bulgaria	&	CEE	Bankwatch	
Network	
Member	 За	Земята—Friends	of	the	Earth	Bulgaria	
Member	 Green	Policy	Institute,	Green party
Former	member	of	parliament	/	
Chair	
Bulgarian	National	Assembly	/	Temporary	Committee	on	the	
Study	of	Shale	Gas,	GERB	
Romania	 	
Analyst,	energy	&	public	policy	 Expert	Forum
Analyst,	energy	&	public	policy	 Expert	Forum
President	 Romanian	Agency	for	Mineral	Resources		
Director	 Romanian	Agency	for	Mineral	Resources		
Counselor	to	energy	minister	 Ministry	of	Energy
Member	of	parliament	/	
commission	member	
Romanian	Parliament	/	Commission	on	Industry	and	
Services	
Ambassador‐at‐large	for	energy	
security	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
President	 Terra	Mileniul	III
Director	 Energy	Policy	Group,	a	Bucharest‐based	think	tank	
	
	
